TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/011491/0114100.000

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                d                                                              NATION, Page 12

On the Fence


The President says he can take America to war without asking
Congress. The lawmakers disagree -- but most would rather not
take a public stand at all.

By RICHARD LACAYO -- Reported by Hays Gorey and Bruce van
Voorst/ Washington


   In the Persian Gulf two massive armies squared off across
miles of desert sand as the Jan. 15 deadline for Iraq's
withdrawal from Kuwait drew nearer. But with the world
anxiously awaiting the outcome of this week's last-chance
meeting between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, a different battle was brewing
back in Washington. This fight was over constitutional
prerogatives and political power. The burning question at the
center of it all: Could President Bush send U.S. troops into
battle without congressional approval?

    The showdown over that issue was surprisingly long in
coming. Congress was in recess last August when Bush dispatched
the first troops to Saudi Arabia, and the lawmakers had little
to say in September and October when they were busy running for
re-election. Only after the November elections, as Bush doubled
U.S. troop strength and successfully pressed the U.N. to adopt
its Jan. 15 ultimatum, did a few Senators and Representatives
speak up. The urgency of participating in a major national
decision finally came home last week as the 102nd Congress
convened in Washington for the first time. Its members faced the
challenge not only of injecting their voice into the process
but also of deciding whether that voice should support or
oppose the President's threat of imminent military action.

    Asserting his constitutional role as Commander in Chief,
George Bush has made it clear that he regards the decision to
go to war as his alone. The debate that erupted in both
chambers last week was a sure sign that after months of holding
their fire, many of the 535 representatives of the American
people disagreed not only with the President but with their own
leadership on that question. Barely half an hour after the
Senate's opening session was gaveled to order, Iowa Democrat
Tom Harkin upset the plans of majority leader George Mitchell
to delay a floor fight over U.S. policy. When Mitchell proposed
to the chamber that no resolutions on the gulf should be
submitted before Jan. 23 unless the leadership approved, Harkin
leaped to his feet. War is "being talked about in coffee shops,
in the workplace and in the homes," the Iowa Democrat declared.
"Now is the time and here is the place to debate."

    Harkin wanted to introduce a resolution co-sponsored by
fellow Democrat Brock Adams of Washington that would prohibit
Bush from attacking Iraqi forces without "explicit
authorization" from Congress. Mitchell looked surprised and
angry. Though for weeks he had been asserting in public that
only Congress has the constitutional power to declare war, he
was anxious to avoid a debate before the Jan. 9 meeting between
Baker and Aziz in Geneva. "This is the place," he replied to
Harkin, then added, "I don't think it's the time." But among
the rank and file, the attitude was "If not now, when?"

    By the next day, Mitchell had acquiesced. A full-fledged
debate on the Harkin-Adams resolution began in the Senate,
where Massachusetts Democrat Edward Kennedy pointedly warned,
"We have not seen such arrogance in a President since
Watergate." The fight spread to the House, despite Speaker Tom
Foley's efforts to contain it. Democrats Richard Durbin of
Illinois and Charles Bennett of Florida announced that they had
enlisted 51 supporters for a resolution similar to the one
Harkin and Adams had introduced in the Senate. Though neither
resolution would be binding, both represent a clear message
to the President that he must make Congress a partner to any
decision to use force.

    The congressional leadership's reluctance to challenge the
President reflected the fears of legislators from both parties.
Many dovish lawmakers prefer to sit on the fence as long as it
remains unclear whether the military option can succeed at
acceptable cost. Though some may loudly question White House
policy, few have ventured any on-the-record challenge. That
suits the President just fine. Bush says he is willing to
continue "consulting" with Capitol Hill leaders, but he has
made no effort to seek outright congressional approval for his
push toward war. His concern, as he explained to TIME in an
interview published last week, is that anything less than an
overwhelming endorsement of his policy by Congress would
convince Saddam that the U.S. is divided and therefore
reluctant to fight.

    Many in Congress agree. "It is awfully difficult for us to
do anything of substance without creating the impression of
congressional and national divisiveness," says Indiana
Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton. "The fact is, in an
instance like this, Congress operates on the margin." The
reasons for that may be more political than patriotic. If Bush
opts for war -- and if Iraq is quickly dislodged from Kuwait at
acceptable cost -- the President's popularity will skyrocket.
A Congress that tries to thwart him now could later appear
guilty of unseemly partisanship. Dovish Democrats in particular
would see themselves labeled once again as wimps in the arena
of global politics.

    But there are dangers in silence as well. If Bush hopes to
convince Saddam that the country is behind its President, no
move would send a stronger signal than a congressional
declaration of war. If war turns disastrous, moreover, a
Congress that had done nothing to deter the President would be
vulnerable to charges that it had let down the people it
purports to represent. Georgia Democratic Senator Sam Nunn
warns that once troops go into battle, it will be too late for
Congress to be arguing the propriety of war. "The time for
debate," he insists, "is before that occurs."

    To a large extent, the hesitations of Congress echo the
ambivalence of the American public. Most polls show that a
majority of Americans support the U.S. goal of expelling Iraq
from Kuwait. Yet the American people are divided over the
prospect of rushing into war on the timetable set by the
President. Many members of Congress returned to Washington last
week reporting that letters from their constituents strongly
favored giving sanctions more time to work and urged the
lawmakers to get into the act.

    Whatever the political consequences, the Constitution does
grant Congress -- and Congress alone -- the power to declare
war. The reason was clearly explained by James Madison, a key
framer of that document who went on to become President. "The
Constitution supposes what the history of all governments
demonstrates," wrote Madison in 1798, "that the Executive is
the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to
it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question
of war in the Legislature."

    Although Bush claims to be a "strict constructionist" when
it comes to the Constitution -- meaning that he respects the
original intentions of those who wrote the document -- he
prefers to emphasize the passage that designates the President
as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Many Presidents have
relied on that provision to initiate quick military action
without congressional approval. Bush's staff members like to
point out that in the country's 200-year history, Presidents
have sent American soldiers abroad 211 times, though Congress
has declared war on only six occasions. (The Tripolitan War,
1801; the War of 1812; the Mexican War, 1846; the Spanish
American War, 1898; World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941.) But
those expeditions rarely involved massive troop deployments or
a prolonged buildup to war. The gulf, in contrast, is a
textbook case of when Congress should be a part of the
decision: speed is not essential, and the stakes are high --
very high.

    Nor is the case for involving Congress merely academic.
Vietnam is now regarded as a warning that disaster awaits any
President who leads the country into a lengthy war without the
support of Congress. Even hawks on Capitol Hill say that in the
event of an extended and bloody struggle in the gulf, it will
be crucial for the President to have Congress on record as with
him from the outset. "If you want Congress in on the landing,"
says House Democrat Stephen Solarz of New York, who supports
the use of force against Saddam, "you had better have Congress
in on the takeoff."

    With debate under way at last in both houses, the question
becomes just what kind of action Congress should take. One
unlikely prospect is that it could offer the President a blank
check to pursue his current policies. To that end, the White
House began preparing a draft resolution for Congress that
would urge "continued action" by the President to fulfill U.N.
mandates calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

    Few members of Congress expect Bush to get that kind of
green light. But neither does there appear to be any enthusiasm
for invoking the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which instructs
a President to withdraw troops 60 days after they are
dispatched unless Congress approves the deployment or grants
an extension. No President has ever recognized the
constitutionality of that Vietnam-era resolution, and Congress
has given up hope that it could use such a slender thread to
reel in the massive military machine in the gulf.

    Congress could pass resolutions supporting further diplomacy
or urging more patience in pursuing the embargo. In either
case, lawmakers would face political humiliation -- and a
full-fledged constitutional crisis -- should the President
decide to ignore them. But Bush may find his maneuvering room
constrained by political expediency as well as constitutional
forms: no President wants to risk taking on the whole
responsibility for a U.S. war by himself.

    Dictatorships are given to boasting that they embody the
will of an undivided people. That claim is always a sham -- and
certainly not one that any democracy can or should aspire to.
But one of the ironies of a confrontation with a foreign
potentate is that it brings with it a temptation to behave like
him. The unimpeded power of a dictator can look enviable to an
American President when the prospect of war brings with it the
need to convince an enemy of this nation's unity and resolve.
If George Bush is succumbing to that temptation now, only
Congress can persuade him -- or compel him -- to resist it.